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INTRODUCTION
Disclosure moved front and center on the campaign finance stage in 2010. 
Indeed, the year just passed witnessed the emergence of not one, but two significant
challenges for our disclosure laws.
2010 began with new concerns about the burdens disclosure can place on the
rights of political participation and association protected by the First Amendment,
with the possibility that the Supreme Court—which had become increasingly skep-
tical about campaign finance regulation since Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
joined the Court—might impose new restrictions on disclosure.
According to media reports in late 2008 and early 2009, financial supporters of
California’s Proposition 8—which successfully sought to overturn a state supreme
court decision legalizing same-sex marriage—had been targeted for harassing phone
calls and e-mails, threats, and vandalism of personal property after information about
their donations had been spread across the Internet by Proposition 8 opponents.1  The
directors of the California Musical Theater in Sacramento and of the Los Angeles
Film Festival both resigned after publicity about their financial support for Proposi-
tion 8 led to threats to boycott their organizations.2  Backers of Proposition 8 ulti-
mately brought suit to have the names and addresses of their campaign donors taken
off the Internet.3  The Proposition 8 allegations were invoked by the Supreme Court
in its highly unusual order on January 13, 2010, in Hollingsworth v. Perry,4 staying
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1 See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 275
(2010); Jesse McKinley, Marriage Ban Donors Feel Exposed by List, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2009, at A12.
2 Briffault, supra note 1, at 275; see also Rachel Abramowitz, Film Fest Director Resigns:
Richard Raddon Steps Down Over Reaction to His Support of Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26,
2008, at E1; Marcus Crowder, Theater Official Resigns: Eckern’s $1,000 Donation for
Prop. 8 Created Furor, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 13, 2008, at A1.
3 See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009). For more
on the Proposition 8 controversy and its implications for disclosure see Briffault, supra note
1, at 274–75; David Lourie, Note, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 8
Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (2009).
4 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010).
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the broadcast of the federal trial of the lawsuit challenging Proposition 8.5  The
Hollingsworth order cited allegations in briefs filed in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission,6 which was then pending before the Court and presented a
disclosure issue, about the alleged harassment of Proposition 8 backers resulting from
disclosure of their donations to the “Yes on 8” campaign.7  Less than three months
before Hollingsworth, the Court had acted in another hot-button disclosure case, stay-
ing a Ninth Circuit order which would have permitted the disclosure of the names and
addresses of the signatories of a petition to place on the Washington state ballot a refer-
endum nullifying that state’s newly-enacted law extending “everything but marriage”
benefits to same-sex couples.8  Two days after the Hollingsworth stay order, the Court
granted a petition for certioriari in the Washington case, John Doe #1 v. Reed.9  With
the Hollingsworth order and Citizens United and Doe v. Reed pending in early January,
the stage seemed set for a major revision of campaign finance disclosure doctrine.
In fact, not only did the Court not restrict the availability of disclosure but both
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed confirmed the preferred position of disclosure in
campaign finance regulation.10  Although the opinions gestured at some recognition
of the possibility that Internet-based activism could result in the abuse of disclosed
information, the Court, particularly in Citizens United, seemed to revel in the fact that
the Internet provides a technological means of assuring more immediate and more
effective disclosure of campaign finance reports.11  The availability of easy Internet-
based dissemination of disclosed personal information about campaign donors pre-
sents a challenge to current disclosure law, but it is a challenge the Court in 2010 was
not yet ready to take up.
Even as Citizens United declined to grapple with the first challenge to disclosure,
it helped create the conditions for the second.  Although it struck down the laws ban-
ning the use of corporate and union treasury funds for independent election spending,
Citizens United also affirmed the validity of laws requiring corporate and union inde-
pendent spenders to disclose their spending, including information concerning their
major donors.12  Indeed, the Court confirmed that disclosure requirements could reach
broadly, well beyond the “express advocacy” which had been the traditional focus of
campaign finance regulation.13
5 Id. at 706–07.
6 130 S. Ct. 876, 913–14 (2010).
7 Hollingsworth, 130 S. Ct. at 707 (citing Brief for Ctr. for Competitive Politics as Amicus
Curiae at 13–14, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205); Reply Brief for Appellant at
28–29, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205)).
8 Doe # 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010).
9 Doe # 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 1133, 1134 (2010) (mem.).
10 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2828–29; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
11 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
12 Id. at 914.
13 Id. at 915.
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But, although constitutionally permissible, disclosure—particularly the disclosure
of the donors paying for the independent spending of the nonprofit corporations that
assumed a prominent position in the 2010 elections—has been difficult to accomplish
in practice.  Most business corporations prefer not to spend directly in their own
names but rather to donate to intermediary entities.14  These intermediaries can pool
the donations of many corporations and wealthy individuals, thereby magnifying their
campaign voice, while hiring skilled political operatives to hone their messages and
determine the most strategically significant races in which to deploy their funds.15 
In 2010, much of the corporate campaign money legalized by Citizens United flowed
through such intermediaries, organized as nonprofits, tax-exempt under either sec-
tion 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code as social welfare organizations, or under
section 501(c)(6) as trade associations and chambers of commerce.16  These groups
often combine electoral advocacy with other forms of political action, including legis-
lative lobbying, public education, and issue advocacy.17  As a result, they can claim
they are not “political committees” under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
and thus not subject to the general disclosure requirements applicable to such com-
mittees.18  Although FECA requires groups other than political committees that en-
gage in electioneering above a threshold level to disclose their donors,19 a decision by
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2010 limits that disclosure obligation to
those donors who have earmarked their contributions for specific campaign ads.20  As
a result, it is easy for many organizations that spend significant sums on electioneer-
ing communications to avoid disclosing their donors.
In other words, even as Justice Kennedy in Citizens United assured the public
that “modern technology makes disclosure rapid and informative”21 so that disclosure
would be an effective response to any corporate spending that might have been un-
leashed by the Court’s decision, federal campaign law as currently interpreted enables
many of these organizations to avoid disclosure of the identities of their donors.  With
much of the independent spending undertaken by organizations with anodyne names
that say little about the organization’s purpose or backers—for example, American
Crossroads Grassroads Political Strategies, Americans for Prosperity, American Future
Fund, The 60 Plus Association—public interest in learning the identities of the donors
14 See Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain Secret as Rules Shift:
Influence of Nonprofits is Felt in Midterms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, at A1.
15 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 287.
16 Luo & Strom, supra note 14.
17 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 287.
18 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(a) (2006) (defining “political committee”).
19 Id. § 434(f).
20 See In re Freedom’s Watch, MUR 6002, Statement of Reasons of Chairman Matthew
S. Peterson and Comm’rs Hunter and McGahn (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug. 13, 2010).
21 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
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behind the organizations has grown.22  According to one account, just 93 of the 202
organizations that engaged in independent spending during the 2010 midterm election
cycle disclosed their donors.23  The press beat a steady drumbeat of stories and editorials
decrying the lack of disclosure of the donors to the nonprofits that spent millions of
dollars in last year’s House and Senate races.24
Congress struggled with this issue in 2010.  In the DISCLOSE Act25 it sought to
revise federal campaign finance law to provide for more effective disclosure.  The
DISCLOSE Act was extremely complex and controversial.  Although it narrowly
passed the House of Representatives,26 it was twice filibustered in the Senate,27 and
was never enacted.  A number of states did pass laws responding to Citizens United,28
but only a handful directly addressed the question of how to obtain the disclosure of
the donors who are ultimately paying for electioneering ads.29
These, then, are the two challenges for disclosure—how to respond to the concern
that Internet-based dissemination of campaign finance information will burden polit-
ical participation, and how to secure the disclosure of donors to politically active non-
profits that engage in both electoral and non-electoral activities.  In a sense they are
two facets of the same problem.  The campaign finance laws of the 1970s and after—
the post-Watergate Era—were focused primarily on large individual contributions to
22 See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg et al., Offering Donors Secrecy, and Going on Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at A1; T.W. Farnam, Disclosure of ‘Issue Ad’ Funding is on the Wane,
WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2010, at A23.
23 Bill Allison, Daily Disclosures, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Oct. 18, 2010, 12:43 PM),
http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/taxonomy/term/independent-expenditures/.
24 See, Editorial, Secret Campaign Money, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2010, at A16; Farnam,
supra note 22; T.W. Farnam & Dan Eggen, Outside Spending Up Sharply for Midterms:
Fivefold Rise from 2006 Elections, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, at A1; Luo & Strom, supra
note 14; Mike McIntire, The Secret Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at A1; Mike McIntire,
Under Tax-Exempt Cloak, Political Dollars Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2010, at A1;
Rutenberg et al., supra note 22; Eugene Robinson, Midterm Campaigns, Brought to You
by . . . ?, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2010, at A4; Kenneth P. Vogel, Secret Donors Fuel Cross-
roads Media Buy, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2010, 2:39 PM), http://politico.com/news/stories/1010
/43155.html.
25 Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE)
Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
26 The measure passed the House on June 24, 2010, by a vote of 219-206. See House
Vote 391—Passing the DISCLOSE Act, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 14, 2011), http://politics.nytimes.com
/congress/votes/111/house/2/391.
27 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Senate GOP Blocks Measure to Require Greater Disclosure,
WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2010, at A6. The vote on the cloture motion to bring DISCLOSE to a
vote was 59-39, or one vote shy of the 60 votes needed to end the filibuster against the bill. Id.
28 See, Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
29 See id.
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candidates.30  This was partly because the major campaign finance problem in the late
1960s and 1970s was large individual donations to candidates, and partly because the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo31 framed campaign finance doctrine around the
model of quid pro quo corruption, which essentially involves donations to candidates
or to organizations that give to candidates.32  As a result, our laws provide a lot of
information about donations, including those involving relatively modest sums, to
candidates.  States that provide for ballot propositions followed the same model, with
disclosure of donations to ballot proposition committees along the same lines.33  But
campaign finance law has given much less attention to disclosure by independent com-
mittees, particularly committees that do not give to candidates, and, committees that—
because of their combination of electoral and non-electoral activities—are not “political
committees.”  And with the longstanding prohibition of corporate spending on the
books,34 campaign finance law had no need to address how to obtain effective disclo-
sure from corporations.  As a result, we can learn a great deal about relatively small
donors to candidates and ballot proposition committees, but not much about very large
donors or corporate donors to large, electorally active nonprofits.
These problems can be remedied.  The first challenge turns on a conflict between
values of transparency and privacy—and dueling assumptions about the rights and re-
sponsibilities of campaign donors—for which there is no obvious answer.  Still, those
tensions can be mitigated by a few changes in our disclosure rules, such as raising our
disclosure thresholds to target only bigger donors or focusing on demographic aggre-
gates rather than individual donors.
The second challenge can be addressed more technically through legislative mea-
sures, including some that were considered by Congress and adopted by a handful of
states, that would require politically active nonprofits that rely on donated funds for
their expenditures to use only funds that have been earmarked for electoral activity. 
Although this is likely to be subject to constitutional challenge, its value in advancing
the goals of disclosure without interfering with protected campaign spending suggests
that it ought to pass muster.
Part I reviews the development of campaign finance disclosure doctrine, with
particular attention to 2010’s two major disclosure decisions—Citizens United and
Doe v. Reed.  Part II turns to the challenge of Internet-based dissemination of dis-
closed personal information about relatively small donors.  Part III then considers how
30 See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
31 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
32 Id. at 26–27.
33 See Reforming the Ballot Initiative Process: Making Direct Democracy Work,
PROGRESSIVE STATES NETWORK, http://www.progressivestates.org/node/22080 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011).
34 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). This is the provision declared unconstitutional in Citizens
United. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
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to obtain disclosure of donors to politically active nonprofits that do not qualify as
political committees but that collect, pool and spend significant sums of money on
electioneering activities.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
A. Before Buckley35
The Supreme Court first considered campaign finance disclosure in the early case
of Burroughs v. United States,36 which upheld the provisions of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925 that required presidential campaign committees to report finan-
cial information, including the names and addresses of contributors, to the clerk of the
House of Representatives.37  The Court had little difficulty finding that Congress had
the power to protect the integrity of federal elections, and that “public disclosure of
political contributions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would
tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.”38  Disclosure was not
seen as burdening freedom of speech.
That changed through a series of cases in the late 1950s and 1960s which demon-
strated that government-mandated disclosure of the identity of individuals affiliated
with controversial organizations could threaten politically vulnerable groups.  NAACP
v. Alabama39 focused on Alabama’s effort to require the NAACP to produce a list of
the names and addresses of all its Alabama members, allegedly in order to determine
whether the NAACP—a corporation chartered in New York—was conducting busi-
ness in Alabama and so would have to register as a foreign corporation doing business
in the state.40  The Court found that the NAACP had shown that “on past occasions
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed those members to
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat[s] of physical coercion and other mani-
festations of public hostility.”41  Under those circumstances “compelled disclosure of
affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy”42 would be as great an interference with
political expression and association as a direct restraint on political activity.43  Accord-
ingly, disclosure could be sustained only if it advanced a “compelling” or “substantial”
state interest—which it did not as the membership list had no substantial bearing on
whether the NAACP was subject to the Alabama foreign corporation statute.44
35 This section provides an abbreviated treatment of the history of disclosure doctrine I
recently examined in Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, supra note 1.
36 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
37 Id. at 548.
38 Id.
39 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 462.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 462–64.
2011] TWO CHALLENGES FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 989
Two years later in Bates v. City of Little Rock,45 the Court rejected the city’s demand
for NAACP membership and employee lists in order to determine whether the civil
rights organization was subject to the municipal occupational license tax.46  Again, the
NAACP demonstrated its members had been subject to “harassment and threats of
bodily harm” and “community hostility and economic reprisals”, so disclosure might
very well cause people to withdraw from the embattled organization.47  Although the
city had a “legitimate and substantial” interest in assuring compliance with its tax
laws, it was unable to show that disclosure of the membership list was necessary to
determine whether the NAACP was subject to tax.48
Shortly after Bates, the Court in Talley v. California49 struck down a Los Angeles
ordinance forbidding the distribution of anonymous handbills.50  Although the ordi-
nance was not targeted at civil rights activists, as the Alabama and Arkansas measures
had been, the Court recognized that handbilling is a medium that is particularly valuable
to the poor, the politically marginal, and the unpopular.51  It concluded that as a gen-
eral rule “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions
of public matters of importance.”52
B. Buckley and After53
As a result of NAACP v. Alabama, Bates, Talley, and similar cases, when the
Court considered FECA’s reporting and disclosure requirements in Buckley v. Valeo54
it could no longer rely simply on Burroughs, but had to consider the First Amendment
implications.  Buckley determined that, given the “potential for substantially infringing
the exercise of First Amendment rights,”55 compulsory disclosure of the names of and
amounts donated by donors must be subject to “exacting scrutiny.”56  Although the
meaning of “exacting scrutiny” was somewhat opaque, it was clearly less stringent
than the strict scrutiny applied to spending limits, albeit more “exacting” than the
rational basis review applied to ordinary economic and social legislation.  Disclosure
could survive a constitutional challenge if it served the “subordinating interests of
45 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 524.
48 Id. at 525.
49 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
50 Id. at 65.
51 Id. at 64–65.
52 Id. at 65.
53 This section also builds on my analysis of Buckley’s treatment of disclosure in Campaign
Finance Disclosure 2.0, supra note 1.
54 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
55 Id. at 66.
56 Id. at 64.
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the state” and if there was a “‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest
and the information required to be disclosed.”57
Buckley upheld disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures because
such disclosure promotes three important governmental interests: informing the voters,
deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption, and enforcing other campaign
finance laws.58  Of these, voter information, has proven to be the most significant. 
Disclosure is really not necessary to the enforcement of other campaign finance rules,
like restrictions on contributions.  That could be accomplished by requiring political
actors to report their finances to the government; public disclosure of that information
would not be necessary.  So, too, while the original impetus for disclosure was the be-
lief that publicity would discourage donors from offering and candidates from accept-
ing large, potentially corrupting contributions, the anti-corruption role now plays a
secondary role.  Federal and most state laws cap the size of contributions to candidates
and political parties,59 so legally authorized contributions are limited and, thus, un-
likely to be corrupting.  Moreover, the Court has regularly upheld disclosure require-
ments with respect to campaign practices which, the Court has said, do not present the
danger of corruption.  These include the expenditures of independent committees,60
and contributions to and expenditures by committees engaged in supporting or oppos-
ing ballot propositions.61
The key constitutional justification for campaign finance disclosure is, thus, voter
information.  Disclosure improves the ability of voters to evaluate candidates because
“it allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than
is often possible on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.”62  By informing
votes about the sources of a candidate’s funds, it also “alert[s] the voter to the interests
to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate[s] predictions
of future performance in office.”63  Requiring independent committees to disclose their
donors “increases the fund of information concerning those who support the candidates”
and “helps voters to define more of the candidates’ constituencies.”64  Disclosure of
donors can be required even in ballot proposition elections “so that the people will be
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.”65
57 Id.
58 Id. at 66–68.
59 See Michael A. Rosenhouse, Validity, Construction, and Application of Campaign
Finance Laws—Supreme Court Cases, 19 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 13–19 (2007) (giving a brief
overview of campaign finance law in the United States).
60 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80–81.
61 See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
62 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 81.
65 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (citing Buckley, 424
U.S. at 66–67; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625–26 (1954)).
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The voter information justification also fits well with the Court’s framing of cam-
paign finance issues in terms of the First Amendment.  By emphasizing the voter infor-
mation that disclosure generates, disclosure actually “further[s] First Amendment values
by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public view.”66
Still, drawing on the lessons of NAACP v. Alabama, Bates and Talley, Buckley
recognized disclosure can burden First Amendment rights.67  But rather than strike
down disclosure requirements, Buckley held only that a party or candidate could win
an exemption if it could demonstrate that, like the NAACP during the turbulent civil
rights era, it was reasonably likely that disclosure would result in threats, harassment,
or reprisals.68  Six years later, in Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee,69
the Court operationalized the exemption when it found that the Socialist Workers
Party, which had long been subject to both government and private harassment, was
constitutionally entitled to an exemption from a state campaign finance law disclo-
sure requirement.70
The Court has on occasion invalidated disclosure laws on constitutional grounds. 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission71 struck down a state law prohibiting the dis-
tribution of anonymous campaign literature.72  The case involved unsigned leaflets
McIntyre composed and printed on her home computer and placed on cars parked
at a meeting concerning a proposed local school tax levy.73  In the Court’s view,
“[I]n the case of [ ] a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and
address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader’s ability to evaluate the docu-
ment’s message.”74  Moreover, requiring McIntyre to put her name and address on her
“personally crafted statement” rather than merely filing an expenditure report with
a regulatory agency struck the Court as “particularly intrusive,” with such “compelled
self-identification” on the leaflet itself likely to chill political activity by ordinary
citizens.75  In short, the information to be disclosed was of little educational value for
voter decision-making, while the format of disclosure—printing a personal name on
the same leaflet as the electioneering message—was seen as likely to discourage the
political activity regulated.
The Court engaged in a similar balancing of informational gains against threats
to political participation in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation76
66 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82.
67 Id. at 68.
68 See id. at 74.
69 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
70 Id. at 101–02.
71 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
72 Id. at 357.
73 Id. at 337.
74 Briffault, supra note 1, at 283 (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49).
75 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 355.
76 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
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which struck down a Colorado law requiring that individuals circulating petitions to
place a measure on the ballot wear identification badges stating their names and indi-
cating whether they were paid for their efforts or were, instead, unpaid volunteers.77 
The badges, like the requirement that McIntyre sign her name to her leaflet, imposed
a significant burden on political activity given “the reluctance of potential circulators
to face the recrimination and retaliation that bearers of petitions on ‘volatile’ issues
sometimes encounter . . . .”78  Moreover, the badges provided the public with no new
information, since a circulator was already required to include her personal name in an
affidavit filed with the state when she submitted the voter signatures she had collected.79 
That much less intrusive form of disclosure satisfied the public’s informational in-
terest.80  As in McIntyre, the educational value for the voters was minimal, while the
threat to political participation was significant.81
Neither McIntyre nor ACLF undermined the Court’s general support for the public
dissemination of campaign finance information.  Indeed, in McConnell v. FEC,82 even
as the Court divided closely over the constitutionality of the provision of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) extending the ban on corporate and union
campaign expenditures to include “electioneering communications”—which went
beyond the “express advocacy” which Buckley had previously indicated marked the
outer limit of constitutionally permissible campaign finance regulation, the Court easily
upheld the extension of disclosure requirements to electioneering communications.83
Only Justice Thomas dissented from this approval of the extension of disclosure;84
even Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who found most of
BCRA’s other central features to be unconstitutional, voted to sustain the broader dis-
closure requirement.  McConnell’s affirmation of BCRA’s disclosure requirements
followed both McIntyre and ACLF, yet neither was cited by the McConnell majority,
which treated the matter as governed by Buckley.85  Justice Thomas’s contention in his
McConnell dissent that McIntyre changed the constitutional analysis of disclosure
and required that disclosure requirements be subject to strict judicial scrutiny was
given short shrift by the rest of the Court.86
77 Id. at 200.
78 Id. at 198.
79 Id. at 197–200.
80 Id. at 198.
81 In both McIntyre and ACLF, the Court also noted that as these cases involved ballot
propositions and not candidate elections, the anti-corruption argument invoked by Buckley
carried little weight. See Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 203; McIntyre v. Oh.
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 351–52 & n.15 (1995).
82 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
83 Id. at 196–202.
84 Id. at 275–77 (Thomas, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Justice Thomas
acknowledged, disclosure was an “issue on which I differ from all of my colleagues.” Id. at 275.
85 See id. at 126–27.
86 See id. at 275–77 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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C. Disclosure in the Roberts Court: Citizens United and Doe v. Reed
In the opening years of the past decade, the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected
constitutional challenges to federal and state campaign finance laws.87  McConnell, how-
ever, proved to be both the high point and the end of the Court’s deferential approach
to campaign finance regulation.  With the retirement of Justice O’Connor—a co-author
of McConnell—and her replacement by Justice Alito, the Court turned sharply against
campaign finance restrictions.  In just three years, the Court struck down a state contri-
bution limit,88 sharply narrowed McConnell’s approval of BCRA’s limits on corporate
and union electioneering communications,89 and invalidated BCRA’s “millionaire’s
amendment” which had relaxed the contribution limits for candidates running against
wealthy self-funding opponents.90  The Supreme Court’s campaign finance U-turn
was dramatically underscored at the start of 2010 in Citizens United v. FEC,91 in
which the Court struck down the sixty-year-old federal ban on the spending of corpo-
rate and union treasury funds in federal elections.92  In so doing, of course, the Court
also overturned the portion of McConnell that had upheld BCRA’s electioneering
communication title.93
Although it has drawn much less public attention, Citizens United also dealt
with—and strongly upheld—some of the disclosure provisions of federal campaign
finance law,94 thus, confirming once again that even campaign spending that cannot
be limited may be subject to disclosure.
Citizens United grew out of an action brought by a conservative advocacy non-
profit corporation to obtain an exemption from the ban on corporate electioneering
communications for a film it had made, Hillary: The Movie, when then-Senator Hillary
Clinton was running for the Democratic nomination for president.95  The film was not
itself an electioneering communication, as it was released in theaters and on DVD but
not broadcast or distributed by cable or satellite, which is a statutory prerequisite
for“electioneering communication” status.96  However, Citizens United also wanted
87 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. 93; FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (upholding
application of federal ban on corporate contributions to a nonprofit corporation); FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (upholding federal limits on party
coordinated expenditures); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding
lower state contribution limits).
88 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
89 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
90 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
91 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
92 Id. at 917.
93 Id. at 913.
94 Id. at 913–17.
95 Id. at 887.
96 Id.
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to distribute the film through video-on-demand (VOD) available to digital cable sub-
scribers.97  Distributing the film on cable, and television broadcasts of ads promoting
the film which mentioned Senator Clinton by name, is electioneering communication
within the statute if aired in any state within thirty days before a primary election in
which she was a candidate.98  Citizens United sought an exemption from the ban on
the use of its treasury funds to pay for the VOD distribution and TV ads promoting
the movie, and also from the disclaimer and disclosure provisions that would apply
to that spending.99  The disclaimer measure requires that any electioneering commu-
nication funded by anyone other than a candidate include a statement that the ad is not
authorized by a candidate and that the spender is responsible for its content.100  The
ad must also display the spender’s name and address or Web site address.101  The dis-
closure provision requires that anyone who spends more than $10,000 on electioneer-
ing communications in a calendar year must file with the FEC a statement identifying
the person making the communication, the amount spent, the election at which it was
directed, and the names and addresses of contributors of $1,000 or more.102
In 2007, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL),103 the Court held BCRA’s
prohibition on corporate and union electioneering communications could be applied,
consistent with the First Amendment, only to communications which were the “func-
tional equivalent of express advocacy,” which would occur “only if the ad is suscep-
tible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate.”104  WRTL did not quite go back to the “magic words” of express
advocacy which had defined and constrained the scope of campaign finance regulation
since Buckley but it indicated that Congress could not go much beyond them, at least
when limiting spending.  Left unclear after WRTL was whether the First Amendment
mandates that the disclosure requirements BCRA had also applied to electioneering
communications must be limited to the functional equivalent of express advocacy, too.
By an 8-1 vote, Citizens United held that disclosure need not be limited to the
“functional equivalent of express advocacy” but could be applied far more broadly.105 
The Court emphasized that “disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more com-
prehensive regulations of speech.”106  The Court insisted on the consistency of dis-
closure with the First Amendment and invoked the voter-information justification for
disclosure: “The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits
97 Id.
98 See id. at 887–88.
99 Id.
100 2 U.S.C.A. § 441d(a)(3) (West 2009).
101 Id.
102 Id. § 434(f)(2).
103 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
104 Id. at 469–70.
105 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010). Only Justice Thomas, the author of
McIntyre, dissented. Id. at 979 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106 Id. at 915 (majority opinion).
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citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. 
This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper
weight to different speakers and messages.”107
Not only did the Court accept that disclosure requirements could reach beyond
express advocacy, it upheld the regulation of the Citizens United ads over the ob-
jection that, as messages intended to sell a movie, they were commercial rather than
political: “Even if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an
interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election.”108 
The Court also upheld the application of BCRA’s disclaimer provision—which essen-
tially requires an organization to take responsibility for its ad in the body of the ad
rather than through a report filed with the FEC—even though “by forcing it to devote
four seconds of each advertisement to the spoken disclaimer” the law necessarily de-
creases the quantity, and possibly the effectiveness, of the group’s speech.109  Like
disclosure, the disclaimer advanced a substantial government interest in voter infor-
mation: “At the very least, the disclaimers avoid confusion by making clear that the
ads are not funded by a candidate or political party.”110
The Court addressed the argument—which had already played a prominent role in
the Hollingsworth v. Perry stay order—that “disclosure requirements can chill dona-
tions to an organization by exposing donors to retaliation,”111 citing the amicus briefs
that pointed to the allegations of blacklisting, boycotts, and threats against the donors
to the pro-Proposition 8 committee.112  The Court reiterated its prior position that an
exemption from disclosure could be created “if there were a reasonable probability
that the group’s members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names
were disclosed.”113  But the Court emphasized that the evidence supporting a reason-
able probability of reprisal had to relate to the group seeking the exemption.  The ex-
amples of retaliation “cited by amici are cause for concern” but they did not support
an exemption for Citizens United, which “offered no evidence that its members may
face similar threats or reprisals.”114  Notwithstanding the Court’s general shift on cam-
paign finance law, Buckley, McConnell, and the deferential approach of those cases to
disclosure were repeatedly invoked; McIntyre and ACLF were nowhere to be found.
Disclosure was a side issue in Citizens United, but it was the central focus of Doe
v. Reed, decided six months later.115  Doe dealt with the application of Washington
107 Id. at 916.
108 Id. at 915.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 916.
112 Id. (citing Brief for Alliance Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae at 16–22, Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205); Brief for Inst. for Justice as Amicus Curiae at 13–16, Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205)).
113 Id.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
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State’s Public Records Act—which makes all public records available for public in-
spection and copying—to the names and addresses of individuals who sign a petition
to subject a law to public referendum.116  Like the Proposition 8 dispute, Doe grew out
of a conflict over marriage equality.  Washington passed a law extending “every-
thing but marriage”117 benefits to same-sex couples, and proponents of Referendum
Measure 71 (R-71) sought to subject the measure to a voter referendum.118  When
pro-marriage equality groups announced they would use the Public Records Act to
obtain and publicly release the names and addresses of R-71 signatories, R-71 backers
brought suit claiming that the state’s disclosure of that information would violate the
First Amendment.119  Plaintiffs argued both that application of the Public Records Act
to referendum petitions generally was unconstitutional and that the specific application
to R-71 was unconstitutional because—given what had happened to proponents of
Proposition 8 in California—there was a reasonable possibility that R-71 signatories
would be subject to “threats, harassment, and reprisal[ ].”120  The Washington federal
district court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the first count and granted
them a preliminary injunction;121 the Ninth Circuit reversed;122 the Supreme Court
stayed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and then granted certiorari.123
The Court’s early intervention and grant of certiorari in the case, along with the
Hollingsworth stay, suggested that some reconsideration of disclosure doctrine in
light of the Proposition 8 experience would be forthcoming.  But that proved not to
be the case.  Although not a campaign finance case, Doe relied heavily on campaign
finance precedents and reemphasized two central themes of campaign finance doc-
trine—that a government publicity law “is not a prohibition of speech, but instead
a disclosure requirement. [The requirement] ‘. . . do[es] not prevent anyone from
speaking,’”124 and that disclosure laws are subject only to “exacting scrutiny,” not
strict scrutiny.125  The Court found the disclosure of the names and addresses of peti-
tion signers to be justified by the state’s constitutionally substantial interest in “preserv-
ing the integrity of the electoral process” by combating fraud, “ferret[ing] out invalid
signatures caused . . . by simple mistake,” and “more generally [in] promoting trans-
parency and accountability in the electoral process.”126  The Court declined to reach
116 Doe v. Reed, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1196–97 (W.D. Wash., 2009), rev’d, 586 F.3d 671
(9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
117 Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Doe, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1194
(No. 09CV05456), 2009 WL3228490, at *4.
118 Doe, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
119 Id. at 1199.
120 Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 117, at *1–2.
121 Doe, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
122 Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
123 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817 (2010).
124 Id. at 2818 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010)).
125 Id. at 2818 & n.2.
126 Id. at 2819.
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the state’s argument that disclosure of petitioner names and addresses also served an
interest in voter information, finding that the electoral integrity interest was enough.127 
However, in echoing Citizens United’s point that disclosure is valuable because it
“promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent that
other measures cannot.”128  Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion effectively linked up elec-
toral integrity and voter information by suggesting an overarching public interest in
being able to monitor and understand the workings of the political process.
In turning to the burden disclosure can place on First Amendment rights, Doe
emphasized that the only issue before the Court was the constitutionality of the appli-
cation of the Public Records Act to referendum petitions generally, not the R-71 petition
in particular.129  The Court acknowledged plaintiffs’ claims concerning the ability of
their opponents to disseminate information concerning the names and addresses—
combined with publicly available maps and phone numbers—of petition signers over
the Internet, as well as their assertions concerning the harassment of Proposition 8
supporters in California.130  But the Court determined there was not sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that the disclosure of the names and addresses of referendum
petition signers would ordinarily create a reasonable probability that signers would be
harassed.131  The Court noted that plaintiffs could bring an as-applied challenge to
disclosure in their specific case—although it provided little guidance as to how that
case ought to be handled.132
Although the decision in Doe was 8-1—with Justice Thomas again, as in Citizens
United,133 the sole dissenter—there were five separate concurring opinions, joined by
six Justices, as the members of the Court appeared interested in framing future debates
about disclosure and, especially, the interpretation of the “reasonable probability” of
harassment standard for an as-applied exception.134  Justices Sotomayor, Stevens,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Scalia emphasized the “minimal” burdens disclosure places on
expressive activity, and the consequent “heavy burden” those seeking exceptions from
generally applicable disclosure requirements should have to bear.135  Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, clearly opposed making it easier to obtain
an exemption from disclosure.  Justice Sotomayor warned that “[a]llowing case-
specific invalidation under a more forgiving standard would unduly diminish the
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2820.
129 Id. at 2820–21.
130 Id. at 2820.
131 Id. at 2821.
132 Id.
133 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
134 See id. at 2822 (Alito, J., concurring).
135 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2828–29 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg); see also id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Breyer) (“[A]ny
effect on speech that disclosure might have is minimal . . . .”).
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substantial breathing room States are afforded to adopt and implement reasonable,
nondiscriminatory measures like the disclosure requirement . . . .”136  Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Breyer, emphasized “there would have to be a significant threat of
harassment directed at those who sign the petition that cannot be mitigated by law
enforcement measures”137 before an exception from disclosure could be granted. 
Justice Scalia indicated he would grant no exceptions at all, and would rely instead
on “laws against threats and intimidation” to deal with misuse of disclosed informa-
tion.138  To some extent, these concurring opinions in Doe reflected the fact that the
case involved signatures on referendum petitions, rather than the disclosure of cam-
paign donors.  Referendum petitions are a part of the state’s law-making process. 
Justice Sotomayor observed that “the process of legislating by referendum is inher-
ently public,”139 and Justice Scalia stressed the “long history of public legislating.”140 
Nonetheless, the clear implication of the opinions of these concurring justices is that
even the enhanced dissemination of disclosed information made possible by the Internet
will not change the constitutional calculus for determining when exemptions from
disclosure are required.
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, took a sharply differing approach which
emphasized the “heavy burdens on First Amendment rights” that “facially valid disclo-
sure requirements can impose in [specific] cases.”141  As a result, Justice Alito focused
on the need for individuals to “be able to obtain an as-applied exemption without clear-
ing a high evidentiary hurdle.”142  Justice Alito was particularly concerned to provide
“speakers” an exemption “quickly and well in advance of speaking” to avoid chilling
protected activity.143  Thus, in order to protect petition signers from harassment, peti-
tion circulators would have to be able to get an exemption from the disclosure require-
ment before beginning to circulate a petition.144  The need for an early exemption
would necessarily affect the nature and amount of evidence required to obtain such
an exemption, particularly for new groups which had not themselves previously been
targeted for harassment.145  Justice Alito asserted that the Proposition 8 experience
“provides strong support for an as-applied exemption” for R-71 backers.146  Justice
Alito was also far less impressed than the other members of the majority with the ade-
quacy of the state’s interests in disclosure.  He contended there were other means of
checking signatures that were sufficient to protect the integrity of the petition process,
136 Id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 2828 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 2836 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 2822 (Alito, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 2823 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 242 U.S. 1, 74 (1946)).
143 Id. at 2822.
144 Id. at 2823.
145 Id. at 2823 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
146 Id.
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and he found no informational interest in publicly disclosing the names and addresses
of petition signers; indeed, he treated that “interest” as really a threat to privacy and the
source of the potential for harassment rather than a substantial public interest at all.147
As Citizens United and Doe v. Reed indicate, the Supreme Court’s post-2005 turn
against campaign finance regulation has not affected its approach to disclosure.  Rather,
the Court has strongly and widely reaffirmed its commitment to disclosure as a consti-
tutionally sound—indeed, constitutionally preferred—mode of regulation.  Citizens
United confirmed the potentially broad reach of disclosure requirements, while both
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed emphasized that exemptions from generally valid
disclosure requirements would require substantial, particularized evidence that the
members or backers of an organization or group seeking an exemption would be sub-
ject to harassment if their identities were made public.  Both cases demonstrate an
awareness of the potential of the Internet to disseminate disclosed information more
widely and effectively than previously.  But Justice Kennedy’s Citizens United opinion
celebrated that development148 while Chief Justice Roberts’s Doe opinion was unwill-
ing to allow the emergence of the Internet to change the standard for an as-applied
exemption, let alone the facial constitutionality of disclosure requirements.149
To be sure, due to the specific nature of the question before it, the Court in Doe
was able to avoid fully coming to grips with the issue of the increased possibilities of
reprisals against donors due to the enhanced dissemination of disclosed information
over the Internet and the use of social networking to organize opponents to challenge
donors.  Four members of the current Court—Justices Scalia, Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor—clearly oppose changing the standards for an exemption.  But Justices
Thomas and Alito are just as clearly willing to make an exemption far easier to ob-
tain.  As a result, the future course of doctrine in this area will turn on the views of
the three justices who have not yet been heard from on the issue—Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy, who were on the Doe Court, and Justice Kagan, who
joined afterwards.
For now at least, responses to the principal challenges to disclosure law are likely
to be legislative rather than doctrinal.  The Court has marked the outer bounds of the
law in this area, but has left federal and state lawmakers and regulators considerable
discretion to develop specific rules.  At present, broad disclosure of both major donors
to independent committees undertaking electioneering communications and of small
donors to candidates and ballot proposition committees are constitutionally permis-
sible, but the former is practically unavailable while the latter may not be desirable. 
The next two Parts consider possible legislative responses to these two questions
for campaign finance disclosure law.
147 Id. at 2824–27.
148 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (noting that while television
might be the favored medium at the moment, the influence of the Internet was likely to grow).
149 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2820–21 (noting that while the data would be posted on the Internet
and searchable by anyone, that by itself did not alter the fundamental test).
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II. THE INTERNET AND SMALL DONOR DISCLOSURE
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy celebrated the fact that “modern technology
makes disclosure more rapid and informative. . . .  With the advent of the Internet,
prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters.”150  In his view, the Internet gives us a “campaign finance
system . . . with effective disclosure [that] has not existed before today.”151  Justice
Kennedy is right to emphasize the qualitative change in the effectiveness of disclosure
resulting from the Internet.
As I have previously noted,152 disclosed campaign finance information is now
accessible, searchable, sortable, and downloadable to an extent unimaginable fifteen
years ago at both the federal and state levels.  In most jurisdictions, anyone with
Internet access can obtain “names, zip codes, employers, occupations, or amounts
given by donors above the reporting threshold.  Moreover, public interest groups can
further search, sort, classify, and analyze campaign finance reports, thus making still
more information available to the public.  The shift to Web-based electronic filing
has dramatically improved the public accessibility of campaign finance information.
This more enhanced disclosure is unlikely to affect large donors who have sig-
nificant interests in government decision making and who tend to treat campaign con-
tributions as a cost of doing business.”  Nor is Internet-based disclosure likely to deter
ideological donors who are so deeply committed to their causes that they do not mind
their views made public.  But many a smaller or less committed donor might be un-
settled if she knew that her political affiliations were being revealed to coworkers or
neighbors.  One recent study found that support for disclosure drops sharply when the
respondent is asked whether she believes that her own name, address, and contribution
amount should be posted on the Internet—and drops still further when asked whether
her employer’s name ought to be on the Internet, as many states require.153  Moreover,
new technologies do not simply provide easy access to contribution reports, they also
enable politically active individuals and groups to disseminate donor information, in-
cluding home addresses and employers, via blogs, websites, and maps, to the public,
thereby implicitly inviting a hostile response.  Social networking sites like Facebook
and MySpace make it easier for opponents to organize and sponsor boycotts and other
protests against donors to causes they oppose.154  This arguably is what occurred in
150 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (2010).
151 Id.
152 This section builds on my analysis of small donor disclosure as discussed in Campaign
Finance Disclosure 2.0, supra note 1.
153 DICK M. CARPENTER, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, DISCLOSURE COSTS: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 7 (2007), available at http://www.ij.org
/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/DisclosureCosts.pdf.
154 See Lourie, supra, note 3, at 150.
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the aftermath of Proposition 8, when proponents claimed they were harassed by threat-
ening e-mails and phone calls, and some had their businesses targeted for boycotts.155
The Proposition 8 experience does not fit easily within the model of exemption
from disclosure articulated in Buckley.  Unlike in NAACP v. Alabama, Talley, and
McIntyre where disclosure burdened members of a persecuted civil rights group, a
fringe political party, or lone individuals, Proposition 8’s donors were part of the
majority of California voters.  Proposition 8 received seven million votes; its backers
raised millions of dollars; and it advanced not a radical idea but “a concept steeped in
tradition and history.”156  Indeed, the district court that considered the pro-Proposi-
tion 8 ballot committee’s effort to bar disclosure of their contributions concluded that
the group’s majoritarian status precluded a First Amendment exemption from disclo-
sure, which it concluded was available only for groups with tiny constituencies pro-
moting “historically unpopular and almost universally rejected ideas . . . whose very
viability was threatened by forced compliance with disclosure laws.”157  However,
anxiety about the consequences of publicity—particularly disclosure that links one’s
political activity to one’s home address or employer—is not limited to members of
minority groups, even if minorities can demonstrate a greater likelihood of being sub-
ject to retaliation, and greater financial vulnerability to harassment and reprisal.  As
the Proposition 8 experience indicates, even majoritarian political causes can be
unpopular with significant segments of the population, and public support for them
can have negative consequences.  Knowing that this information about their political
activity will be broadcast over the Internet may lead some individuals to become less
politically active.
The Proposition 8 experience and the dispute over Washington’s Referendum 71
that led to Doe raise the question of whether a hostile response to disclosed political
activity from other members of the public is an acceptable cost of disclosure.  Although
some of the allegations in Proposition 8 involved allegations of “repugnant and de-
spicable” death threats, most of the other claimed acts of harassment and reprisal were
relatively milder, albeit still hostile—the theft of yard signs, the defacing of “Yes
on 8” bumper stickers, and nasty e-mails and Facebook messages.158  The district
court found such incidents were unsurprising “during the heat of an election battle sur-
rounding a hotly contested ballot initiative.”159  Moreover, while threats of physical
violence and vandalism were “deplorable” and properly subject to criminal sanction,
the court viewed business boycotts and verbal challenges as acceptable forms of “unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate.160  Similarly, in Doe, the organizations
155 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
156 ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1199–1205 (describing the threats and acts of vandalism against Prop. 8 supporters).
159 Id. at 1217.
160 Id. at 1217–18 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)).
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pursuing disclosure of the names of the petition signers claimed that their goal was
merely to stimulate a state-wide dialogue about marriage rights with their opponents.161 
As the co-director of KnowThyNeighbor.org explained, his group wanted to post on
the Internet the names of those who signed the R-71 petition so “that conversations
are triggered between people that already have a personal connection like friends, rela-
tives, and neighbors. . . . conversations [that] can be uncomfortable for both parties.”162
But what for one person is a “conversation”—and an “uncomfortable” one at that—
will for another be a confrontation, made especially unpleasant by the fact that it might
be with a friend, relative, or neighbor.  Is the possibility of uncomfortable conversation/
confrontation an acceptable price to pay for the transparency and voter information
benefits of disclosure?  Is it actually a desirable addition to uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open debate on matters of public concern—“the essence of self-government”163—
as Judge England claimed in the Proposition 8 case?  Or is it an undue burden on the
freedoms of speech and association and the right to petition for a redress of grievances?
Strikingly, this question divided two members of the Supreme Court who frequently
agree with each other on most other issues.  Justice Alito quoted KnowThyNeighbor
.org’s “uncomfortable conversation” language to support his view that the posting of
the names and addresses of petition signers on the Internet created a “vast” potential
for harassment,164 while Justice Scalia urged that enduring “harsh criticism, short of
unlawful action, is a price our people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-
governance.”165  Where Justice Alito expressed the fear that disclosure which enables
opponents “to locate and contact [petition signers and engage them in discussion] . . .
becomes a means of facilitating harassment that impermissibly chills the exercise of
First Amendment rights,”166 Justice Scalia concluded that “[r]equiring people to stand
up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy
is doomed.”167  Justice Scalia was utterly untroubled by disclosure requirements that
subject people to the “accountability of criticism.”168
Justice Scalia may be right that democracy in this, “the Home of the Brave,” must
involve a willingness to accept criticism and that the Constitution may permit Congress
and the states to require citizens to demonstrate a certain amount of “civic courage”
when they make campaign contributions.169  And the judge in the Proposition 8 case
is surely correct in observing that “[j]ust as contributors to Proposition 8 are free to
speak in favor of the initiative, so are opponents free to express their disagreement
161 John Doe #1 v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 675 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2009).
162 Id.
163 ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
164 Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2825 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 2825 (Alito, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168 Id.
169 See id.
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through proper legal means”170 including boycotts, so long as law enforcement responds
effectively to violence and vandalism.171  Yet Justice Alito is equally correct in warning
that such responses can chill political participation by ordinary citizens who would pre-
fer not to have evidence of their political beliefs—tied to their home addresses, phone
numbers, and other personal identification information—broadcast over the Internet.172
There is no obvious constitutional standard for setting the balance between these
privacy and publicity—and anonymity and accountability—concerns.  One possibility
would be to vary the availability of disclosure according to the nature of the election
question, with less disclosure for hot-button ideological issues where retaliation might
be more likely.  But it will often be difficult to tell in advance which issues will be
highly charged, and which will not.  The amount of controversy an issue stirs up can
vary from place to place and election cycle to election cycle, and even ballot ques-
tions involving regulatory or tax issues—think of Proposition 13173—can be contro-
versial.  And, of course, it would be even more difficult to apply such a standard in
candidate elections.
A better approach would be to change the focus of our disclosure laws.174  First,
we should raise the monetary thresholds for the disclosure of personal information
about donors.  Our thresholds for the disclosure of campaign donors tend to be quite
low—much lower than they need to be in order to effectively inform the public about
a candidate’s or issue committee’s financial backers.  Federal law requires that the
donors of $200 or more to a candidate in an election be disclosed.175  That threshold was
adopted in 1979176 and has not been raised since.177  If it had been adjusted for infla-
tion, the disclosure threshold in 2010 would have been $601.178  The original federal
Publicity Act of 1910 used a disclosure threshold for Congressional races of $100.179 
If we used that number, adjusted for inflation, the 2009 threshold for disclosure would
have been $2,274.180  Many state thresholds are even lower.  The California disclosure
threshold that led to the disclosure of the Proposition 8 donors was $100.181  In eighteen
states and the District of Columbia, the threshold is $50 or less;182 in six states there
170 ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
171 Id. at 1217–18.
172 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2825 (Alito, J. concurring).
173 See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
174 The proposals that follow track similar proposals I made in Campaign Finance
Disclosure 2.0, supra note 1, at 300–02.
175 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2006).
176 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 102,
93 Stat. 1339 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2006)).
177 Briffault, supra note 1, at 300.
178 See U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011).
179 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 83 (1976).
180 See U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 178.
181 ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
182 Id. at 1221 n.10.
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is no threshold at all;183 even the donors of the smallest campaign contributions must
be identified.184
Our disclosure thresholds are also low by world standards.  A 2007 study of dis-
closure thresholds around the world calculated in terms of how many days it would
take a person earning the average income in that country to earn the threshold amount
found that it would take 2.4 days to earn the disclosure threshold amount in the United
States, but 7 days in Japan, 10 days in New Zealand, 26 days in the United Kingdom,
112 days in Israel, and 154 days in Germany.185  We require disclosure from a higher
proportion of contributors than is the case in most other democratic countries.
Raising the disclosure threshold would protect the privacy of the most vulnerable
political actors—small donors—with little or no harm to the public education function
of disclosure.  Indeed, disclosure that is more tightly focused on larger donors would
actually serve that function better.  As I have previously observed, “Knowing the
names and addresses of large numbers of individual small donors is unlikely to be
helpful to the public or the many intermediaries—the press, public interest groups,
bloggers, political scientists—who evaluate campaign finance information.”186 These
names and addresses will mean little or nothing to most people.  Indeed, massive dis-
closure of small donor information threatens to inundate us in a sea of useless data,
while potentially distracting attention from the big donors whose funds play a more
meaningful role in understanding a candidate and her likely place in the political arena. 
Raising the disclosure threshold makes it easier to focus on and assess the significance
of “a candidate’s or committee’s major financial backers, much as clearing away the
haystack ought to make it easier to see the needles.”187
There is no obvious standard for deciding what the disclosure threshold ought to
be.  But we could begin by raising the federal threshold to $600 to take account of
three decades of inflation, and then indexing it biennially thereafter.  Alternatively,
for all but the largest donors, only general information about donors in the aggregate,
not information identifying specific individuals, should be publicly disclosed.  Such
individual information would still be reported to the FEC or state regulators, but,
like the information provided to the IRS or the Census Bureau, personal names and
addresses would be kept confidential.  Instead, regulators would disclose only such
information as zip code and profession or occupation or industry, along with the size
of the donation.  This could be aggregated either directly by a campaign finance agency,
or, where there is properly accessible and usable online disclosure, by interested inter-
mediaries, to determine which candidates, parties or political committees are getting
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 Ross Schaap, Disclosure Rules: How Institutions Influence Campaign Finance
Regulation, 6 ELECTION L.J. 89, 98 (2007). The United States federal threshold was in line
with those of Canada and Australia. See id.
186 Briffault, supra note 1, at 300.
187 Id. at 300–01.
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what sizes of donations from particular places or economic sectors.  This change
could be adopted in tandem with raising the disclosure threshold, so that the federal
disclosure would be set at, say, $600, but individual identifying information would be
available only for those who give, say, $1,200 or more.  Or $200 could be retained as
the reporting threshold but the threshold for individual identifiable disclosure would
be, say, $1,000.  Donations from $200 through $999 would be subject to aggregate
data analysis, but only givers of $1,000 or more would be publicly identified.
Targeting disclosure on the major players would make sense even without the
concern that the Internet facilitates hostile retaliation against campaign donors.  As I
have suggested,188 more targeted disclosure would sharpen the public’s focus on those
donors who are more likely to be publicly known.  So, too, aggregate data would pro-
vide a better measure of the groups and interests seeking to influence the election. 
Focused disclosure would protect the political privacy of the middling donors whose
contributions present little danger of undue influence and who are more likely to be
discouraged from giving by the prospect of broad public dissemination of their names,
addresses, and employers.
To be sure, larger donors to controversial causes would still potentially be subject
to harassment or economic retaliation by their most excited antagonists.  But Justice
Scalia’s call for civic courage suggests that it is not entirely inappropriate that large
donors be ready to justify their actions publicly.  By the very size of their financial
contribution, large donors are demonstrating an intense degree of support for a candi-
date, party, or cause.  Large donors are much likelier to be wealthier and therefore less
vulnerable to economic reprisals than small and middling givers.  They are also more
likely to be repeat participants and more used to public attention to their donations. 
Moreover, they are seeking to use their wealth and intensity of commitment to ex-
ercise a greater degree of influence over a collective, public decision than not only
the vast majority of voters, but also most other donors.  There is also a greater public
information value in the disclosure of the names of large donors as there is a greater
likelihood their names will mean something to some voters.
Doe v. Reed indicates that a more tightly focused disclosure law is not constitu-
tionally required despite concerns that the Internet is increasing the burden disclosure
places on First Amendment rights.  But even if not constitutionally mandated, a more
focused law would do a better job of reconciling the competing constitutional values
that ought to inform disclosure.  Focusing on major donors would protect the political
privacy of smaller contributors and eliminate the disincentive to making contributions
that disclosure might cause while simultaneously protecting, and arguably advancing,
the voter-information purpose underlying disclosure.
III. EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE OF DONORS TO NONPROFIT INDEPENDENT SPENDERS
Citizens United confirmed that corporations and unions that engage in inde-
pendent spending and electioneering communication may constitutionally be subject
188 See id. at 301–02.
1006 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:983
to disclosure.189  But actually obtaining disclosure of corporate spending has proven
difficult in practice.  There is considerable evidence that business corporations prefer
not to spend directly, that is, through ads taken out by the corporations themselves. 
Instead, they prefer to act through intermediaries, that is, by donating to other organi-
zations that then sponsor the political ads.190  This can facilitate the pooling of funds
from many like-minded corporate donors and the hiring of political strategists to deter-
mine where those funds can be used to the greatest political effect.  Under current law,
it may also make it possible for corporations to avoid disclosure.
Legal developments since Citizens United have authorized both the pooling of cor-
porate funds with intermediaries and the avoidance of disclosure.  In SpeechNow.Org
v. FEC,191 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sit-
ting en banc held that the federal statutory limit on donations to political committees
could not, consistent with the First Amendment, be applied to committees that make
only independent expenditures.192  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously
taken the same position in a case involving North Carolina’s campaign finance law,193
and a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals followed SpeechNow with a deci-
sion holding that a city ordinance imposing a monetary cap on contributions to inde-
pendent expenditure committees violates the First Amendment.194  The FEC declined
to seek Supreme Court review of SpeechNow,195 and instead followed it with two im-
portant advisory opinions authorizing political committees that intend to make only in-
dependent expenditures to accept unlimited donations.196  One of the advisory opinions
confirmed that such an independent expenditure committee could accept unlimited
donations from corporations and unions as well as individuals.197
Technically, these cases and FEC advisory opinions deal only with “political com-
mittees,” a formal legal category under federal campaign law consisting of organi-
zations whose major purpose is electoral.198  Such “political committees” are required
to register with the FEC and abide by the organizational, record-keeping, and report-
ing rules applicable to such committees.199  But the principle that an organization
that engages only in independent expenditures and does not make contributions to
189 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
190 Luo & Strom, supra note 14.
191 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
192 Id. at 696.
193 See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
194 See Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010).
195 Brief for Respondent, Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (No. 10-145), 2010 WL
3777212 at *13 (opposing the petition for certiorari).
196 See FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, at 1–2 (2010); FEC Advisory Op. 2010-09, at 1–2
(2010).
197 See FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, at 3.
198 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2006).
199 See id. §§ 432–34.
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candidates or parties may accept contributions in unlimited amounts seems generally
applicable to all politically active groups.  As a result, corporations may now make
unlimited contributions to committees that make only independent expenditures.200
Citizens United held that the identities of the donors who pay for such expendi-
tures are subject to disclosure,201 but the reality is more complicated than that.
If the organization is a “political committee” it must disclose those donors who
have given it more than a threshold amount.202  Buckley, however, interpreted the fed-
eral statutory definition of “political committee” to apply only to organizations that
have “the major purpose” of supporting the nomination or election of a candidate for
federal office.203  It is unclear whether the requirement that electoral activity be “the
major purpose” of an organization is a constitutional prerequisite for political com-
mittee status and thus controls state law definitions of political committee status for
purposes of state elections;204 but the “major purpose” requirement is the governing
interpretation of federal law.  That means that political committees organized under
section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts from taxation the income
of organizations whose primary purpose is to influence elections, are subject to donor
disclosure requirements, but nonprofit corporations organized under either 501(c)(4)
or 501(c)(6) are not.205  In order to qualify for tax-exempt status, (c)(4)’s and (c)(6)’s
must not be primarily engaged in electoral politics, although they can combine electoral
activity with legislative lobbying, voter education, and issue advocacy more generally.206 
In the 2010 Congressional elections, many of the largest spenders—such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce,207 Americans for Prosperity,208 American Crossroads GPS,
200 See Mich. Chamber of Commerce v. Land, 725 F. Supp. 2d 665 (W.D. Mich. 2010)
(holding state prohibition on corporate campaign contributions cannot be constitutionally
applied to contributions to a committee that makes only independent expenditures).
201 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
202 26 U.S.C. § 527(j) (2006).
203 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976) (per curiam).
204 Compare N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 287–89 (4th Cir. 2008)
(holding “major purpose” test constitutionally required), with Human Life of Wash. Inc. v.
Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding “major purpose” not consti-
tutionally required), cert. denied, 2011 WL 588952 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011) (No. 10-686).
205 Compare 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4), with 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6).
206 See Benjamin S. Feuer, Comment, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard Cash:
Evaluating the FEC’s New Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 925, 947–48
(2006); Edward B. Foley & Donald Tobin, The New Loophole?: 527s, Political Committees,
and McCain-Feingold, BNA, http://www.bna.com/moneyandpolitics/loophole.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011).
207 See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Scott Wilson, Obama Steps Up Attack on Chamber, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 2010, at A1.
208 See, e.g., Editorial, ‘Educating’ the Electorate: Americans for Prosperity Unsubtle
Campaign, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A24; Felicia Sonmez, Who is “Americans for
Prosperity”?, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2010, 12:21 PM),  http://voices.washingtonpost.com
/thefix/senate/who-is-americans-for-prosperit.html.
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and American Future Fund209—were either organized under 501(c) or relied on a
(c)(4) or (c)(6) unit for much of their campaign spending on the theory that they
were not primarily electoral committees and were therefore not subject to regulation
(and disclosure) as FECA political committees.210
For individuals or organizations that are not “political committees,” disclosure
may still be required if the individual or organization undertakes independent spend-
ing or spends money on electioneering communications above a dollar threshold.211 
Federal law requires such organizations to disclose the identities of the donors “who
contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person making the disburse-
ment.”212  This was the provision interpreted and upheld in Citizens United;213 Citizens
United is not a FECA “political committee” but it did propose to make electioneer-
ing communication expenditures above the threshold level.214  However, an action
taken by the FEC a few months after Citizens United makes it extremely easy for such
organizations to avoid having to disclose their donors.
According to the FEC’s regulation interpreting the statute, corporations engaged
in independent electioneering communication are required to disclose those donors
above the monetary threshold whose donations were “made for the purpose of further-
ing electioneering communications.”215  That regulation was adopted in the aftermath
of WRTL, which reinterpreted BCRA’s ban on corporate and union electioneering
communications.216  BCRA had originally barred all corporate and union electioneer-
ing communications, and so it did not address disclosure by corporations or unions that
make electioneering communications.217  When WRTL relaxed the electioneering com-
munication spending restriction, the issue arose as to how to apply the contributor dis-
closure requirement to corporations and unions, which are not formed for or primarily
engaged in electoral activity, and receive funds from sources—shareholders, customers,
members, “or in the case of a non-profit corporation, donations from persons who
209 See, e.g., Farnam & Eggen, supra note 4; Rutenberg et al., supra note 22; Matt Viser,
Donor Names Stay Secret as Nonprofits Politick, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www
.boston.com/news/politics/articles/2010/10/07/donor_names_stay_secret_as_nonprofits
_politick.
210 See Fred Wertheimer, Calling on the IRS to Investigate Crossroads GPS’ Tax Status,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 2010, 1:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fred-werthemier
/irs-called-on-to-investig_b_750875.html; Sonmez, supra note 208; About Us, AMERICAN
FUTURE FUND, http://www.americanfuturefund.com/about-us (last visited Apr. 10, 2011);
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com
/about/faqs (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
211 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2006) (the threshold is $10,000 during any calendar year).
212 Id. § 434(f)(2)(F).
213 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).
214 Id. at 887–88.
215 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2009).
216 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 477–79 (2007).
217 Id. at 457.
2011] TWO CHALLENGES FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 1009
support the corporation’s mission”218—that do not necessarily intend to fund electioneer-
ing.  Accordingly, the FEC adopted a regulation limiting the disclosure of donations
only to those “made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.”219
In 2010, by a 3-2 vote, the FEC applied that regulation very narrowly, determining
that the disclosure of the identity of a donor will not be required unless the donation
was made expressly “for the purpose of furthering the electioneering communication
that is the subject of the report.”220  The case involved Freedom’s Watch, Inc., a non-
profit advocacy corporation that spent $126,000 on electioneering communication
ads in a congressional special election in the spring of 2008.221  Freedom’s Watch
filed the required electioneering communication report concerning its spending but
did not disclose any donors.  Indeed, Freedom’s Watch did not disclose any donors
for any of its 2008 electioneering communications because, it contended, all the dona-
tions it received were to support the organization’s general purposes, and none were
earmarked for specific electioneering communications.222  Three members of the FEC
concluded that under those circumstances Freedom’s Watch was under no duty to dis-
close its donors and, as a result, the complaint brought against Freedom’s Watch for
its failure to disclose its donors was dismissed.223
After Freedom’s Watch, an organization—other than a “political committee”—
that accepts donations not specifically earmarked for electioneering ads and uses them
to make electioneering communications is under no federal election law requirement
to disclose the identities of its donors or the amounts donated.  Indeed, Freedom’s
Watch protects even those donations given for the purpose of electioneering communi-
cations generally so long as the donor has not indicated that it wants its funds used in
a particular contest.  As a result, a firm can commit tens of thousands of dollars for
spending in federal elections so long as it does not indicate it wants the funds to be
spent in a specific race.
Freedom’s Watch involved the FEC’s interpretation of its own regulations.224  It
is not a constitutional case; it does not affect state disclosure laws or even limit the
ability of the FEC to adopt new regulations that would require the disclosure of dona-
tions used to pay for electioneering communication.  However, the decision and the
FEC ruling point to what is the central disclosure question resulting from Citizens
United—whether and how to require the disclosure of the identities of firms (and
wealthy individuals) who look to finance electioneering communications by making
contributions to intermediary organizations that claim not to be primarily electoral
and that take funds for both electoral and nonelectoral purposes.
218 Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,911 (Dec. 26, 2007).
219 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2009).
220 In re Freedom’s Watch, MUR 6002, Statement of Reasons of Chairman Matthew S.
Peterson and Comm’rs Hunter and McGahn (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug. 13, 2010).
221 Id. at 6.
222 Id. at 2.
223 Id. at 1.
224 See id. at 3.
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Conceivably the definition of political committee could be expanded to include
non-major purpose organizations.  But the constitutionality of such a move is uncer-
tain, and, in any event, that just pushes back the issue a step as it is not clear that an
organization that undertakes both electoral and non-electoral political activities can be
required to disclose all its donors.  Disclosure requirements implicate First Amendment
rights and are justified in terms of their ability to vindicate the voter “interest in know-
ing who is speaking about a candidate . . . .”225  But when is it fair to say that someone
who gives to a multi-purpose organization which devotes some of its expenditures
to electioneering communications and others to lobbying or public advocacy about
issues is speaking about a candidate?
Even many of the states that define “political committee” broadly to pick up orga-
nizations for which elections are “a” but not “the” major or primary purpose limit the
disclosure of contributions to those made “for the promotion or defeat of a candidate,”226
“for the purpose of furthering” campaign expenditures,227 or for the purpose of making
an “independent expenditure.”228  If, like the FEC’s interpretation of the federal law
concerning disclosure of electioneering communications by non-political committees,
this requires express earmarking of the contribution for a particular campaign expen-
diture in order for the disclosure requirement to apply, then disclosure will be easily
evaded.  Moreover, requiring these organizations to register as political committees
also raises the question of whether it is constitutional to impose a host of administra-
tive burdens on organizations which are not primarily electoral.
A better approach is to require disclosure without mandating that the organization
become a political committee and to require a politically active organization that relies
primarily on donated funds to separate the funds it uses for electioneering into elec-
tioneering accounts, kept distinct from the funds it uses for other purposes.  Donors
would be given the opportunity to decide whether their funds are used for election-
eering—in which case the names of, and other information about, donors above a dollar
threshold would be subject to disclosure—or not used for electioneering, in which
case those donors would not be so disclosed.  This approach would avoid the impo-
sition of all the regulatory burdens associated with political committee status, and
would tightly link up the electoral use of donated funds, public disclosure, and donor
intent.  In so doing, it would also resolve the Freedom’s Watch problem of evasion of
any “for the purpose” requirement since it would provide recipient organizations with
an incentive to identify donations as for an electoral purpose, otherwise they could
not so use them.  And it would not require that donations be earmarked to support
225 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
226 See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d 245, 263 (D. Me. 2010)
(discussing Maine’s election law).
227 See W. VA. CODE ANN § 3-8-2(E) (LexisNexis 2010).
228 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103.7 (2010) (defining an exception to a $5,000 limit on
contributions).
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or oppose a particular candidate in a particular election.  An intent to support the
organization’s electoral activity would be enough.
This proposal builds on a provision of the DISCLOSE Act,229 which sought to
address the problem of obtaining disclosure of the identities of donors to politically
active nonprofit organizations, particularly 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations and
501(c)(6) chambers of commerce and business leagues.230  As passed by the House of
Representatives, the DISCLOSE Act stopped short of mandating the use of electioneer-
ing accounts for the electioneering activities of multi-purpose organizations.231  Instead,
the Act provided for (i) disclosure of donations to nonprofits earmarked for electoral
use, (ii) the creation of an optional Campaign Related Activity Account (CRAA)232
as the exclusive account for campaign spending and the disclosure of only donations
above a high $6,000 threshold to the optional CRAA, (iii) a mechanism for donors
to nonprofits to provide that their funds will not be used for electoral purposes; and
(iv) a requirement that if a nonprofit does not create a CRAA and undertakes inde-
pendent expenditures or electioneering communications that all donations of $600
or more to the organization would be subject to disclosure except for contributions
from donors who had expressly directed that their donations not be used for electoral
purposes.233 The DISCLOSE Act succumbed to a Senate filibuster in the fall of 2010
and so was not enacted, but the CRAA concept provides a useful model for future
disclosure reform.
As the CRAA superficially resembles a political action committee (PAC) it would
probably trigger a challenge that it is in tension with Citizens United’s determination
that corporations and unions may not be compelled to channel their election spending
through a PAC.234  But unlike the PAC requirement struck down in Citizens United,
this proposal would not limit the size of contributions to the campaign account nor
would it require that the account be housed in a separate committee or be subject to the
organizational requirements that Citizens United found so troubling.  The account would
be no more than a bookkeeping device for separating and tracking electoral and non-
electoral donations and assuring that the former are reported, not a separate committee.
To be sure, by requiring that only donations to a nonprofit intermediary’s electoral
spending account can be used for electioneering, the proposal may be said to place a
limit on the amount of money the intermediary can spend on elections, and so may
be subject to constitutional challenge.  But the CRAA would not operate as a cap on
229 Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE)
Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 213 (2010).
230 See id. § 211(a)(5)(F) (defining the scope of covered organizations).
231 See id. § 213 (mandating use of separate accounts only where an organization has
already established such accounts).
232 See id. (proposing an amendment to 2 U.S.C. § 431 entitled, “Optional Use of Separate
Account by Covered Organizations for Campaign-Related Activity”).
233 See id. §§ 211–13.
234 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897–99 (2010).
1012 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:983
spending.  Unlike the law governing PACs, there would be no limits on the size of
donations to the account, or on who could contribute to, or be solicited to contribute
to, the account.  Moreover, the CRAA would protect the interest of donors to mixed
electoral/nonelectoral organizations in not having their donations used for electoral
activity if that is not their intention.  Unlike the former federal ban on the use of cor-
porate treasury funds for electioneering,235 the proposal does not bar corporations from
using their treasury funds to engage in electioneering but it recognizes that the resources
of the intermediary (c)(4)s and (c)(6)s that emerged as 2010’s most prominent cam-
paign actors come not from treasury funds but from outside donations.
The CRAA requirement would also empower donors to determine whether their
donations will be used in elections and protect them from disclosure if their funds are
not put to an electoral purpose.  To be sure, the proposal bears a family resemblance
to the “dissenting shareholder protection” rationale for the corporate spending ban
rejected in Citizens United.236  But that now-unconstitutional law made no provision
enabling shareholders who wanted their funds to be used for electoral purposes to
authorize such electoral action—in effect, it protected shareholders whether they wanted
such protection or not.237  This proposal permits willing donors to give their funds in
unlimited amounts to the nonprofit to be used for electoral purposes, and it is narrowly
tailored to regulate only those corporations that rely on donations and, thus, are suscep-
tible of being used by other political actors to avoid legitimate disclosure obligations.
Some of the specifics of the CRAA proposal, as incorporated in the DISCLOSE
Act, are troubling, particularly the two different disclosure thresholds linked to whether
or not an organization created a CRAA.  The DISCLOSE Act did not mandate the
CRAA mechanism but provided it as an option.238  For organizations that did not
take the CRAA option but still engaged in electoral spending, donors above the $600
threshold would have been disclosed unless they took affirmative steps to exclude their
donations from the organization’s electoral activities.239  In effect, the electoral purpose
of such donations would have been presumed.  The $6,000/$600 differential thresholds
for disclosure were clearly intended to be a carrot for organizations to create CRAAs. 
But it seems problematic to apply a much higher disclosure threshold for donations
expressly given for campaign-related activity than for donations not expressly so given.
Moreover, the provision of only an optional CRAA combined with the $6,000/
$600 differential to encourage its use seems self-contradictory.  The authors of the
235 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81.
236 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
237 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a),
116 Stat. 81, 88–89.
238 See Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE)
Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 213 (2010) (detailing the optional use of separate accounts for
campaign-related activity).
239 See id. § 211 (making an exception for expenditures covered under the CRAA).
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DISCLOSE Act presumably thought they could not force nonprofits to rely exclusively
on dedicated campaign accounts for their electoral activities.  But the carrot of dif-
ferential disclosure thresholds implicitly relies on the stick of disclosure of all donors
above $600 other than those who have expressly requested that their donations be ex-
cluded from political activity.  But if that can be required, then surely Congress could
also require nonprofits to create and rely on CRAAs for their political activity.  Indeed,
mandating that politically active nonprofits dependent on contributions use a dedi-
cated campaign account for electoral activities actually more carefully respects the
constitutional rights of donors since it more clearly limits disclosure to those who
intend to support campaign-related activity.  By contrast, under the DISCLOSE Act’s
approach, organizations that did not create CRAAs would have been required to dis-
close all donors above the $600 who did not affirmatively opt out of electoral politics,
rather than only those who opted in.
Should Congress return to the corporate donor disclosure issue, it should mandate
the use of campaign accounts by organizations such as (c)(4)s and (c)(6)s that serve
as vehicles for the pooling and spending of the funds of donors interested in financ-
ing campaign activity.  This would simultaneously limit disclosure to those who have
chosen to support campaign activity by contributing to a dedicated campaign account
while protecting the political privacy of those who have not so chosen.  Unlike the PAC
model for corporate campaign spending struck down in Citizens United,240 this would
not limit the amount of money any donor could give the campaign account, or the cate-
gories of people or organizations that could contribute to such an account.  As such,
unlike the PAC, this would not inhibit spending.  Moreover, consistent with the concern
to avoid over-disclosure and to target only major donors, any disclosure requirement
should use the $6,000 threshold for CRAA donors as proposed in last year’s DISCLOSE
Act rather than the lower $600 alternative threshold.  This would target only major
donors and also make it more likely that the major donors are actually disclosed.
CONCLUSION
The two challenges referred to in the title of this article are really different aspects
of one challenge—how to enable disclosure to perform its voter information function
effectively while minimizing the possible burden it may impose on political partici-
pation and political privacy.  On the one hand, our laws currently require too much
disclosure from individuals who donate relatively small amounts of money.  On the
other hand, our laws are ineffective in obtaining the disclosure of the sources of the
often very large sums of money donated to independent expenditure committees.
Over-disclosure has the potential to discourage the political participation of the
small donors whose contributions are among the least corrupting aspects of the cam-
paign finance process, and whose increased involvement is desirable for democratizing
240 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
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our campaign finance system.  The under- or non-disclosure of the donors to inde-
pendent expenditure committees shrouds a large and growing component of campaign
money in secrecy at a time when the public is clamoring for transparency.
The over-disclosure problem threatens to be exacerbated by the growing political
role of the Internet which greatly facilitates both the dissemination of disclosed infor-
mation and the organization of a hostile response to donors to certain candidates or
causes.  Although it is unclear how serious the threat of Internet-based reprisals against
small donors will be, the very awareness of the wide dissemination of disclosed political
information and of the possibility of a hostile response could itself chill donors.  The
under-disclosure problem, in turn, has exploded in the aftermath of Citizens United
and the green light that decision gives to corporate participation in electoral politics. 
Although corporations are not the only donors who seek to act through intermediaries,
they seem to have a particular preference to avoid publicity of their campaign role.
It is particularly striking that at a time when the Supreme Court has imposed more
restrictions on, and is thus exerting a greater sway over, campaign finance law than
ever before, it has chosen to take a relatively modest role in overseeing disclosure. 
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed together have endorsed disclosure as the preferred
mode of campaign finance regulation, confirmed that disclosure laws will be subject
to a relatively relaxed standard of review, embraced a relatively expansive view of the
content of the communications that can be subject to disclosure, and, even—as the
Court acknowledged the growing concern about the impact of Internet-based disclo-
sure on donors—reaffirmed the relatively heavy burden of persuasion it previously
imposed on political actors seeking broad exemptions from disclosure.  Disclosure
is still subject to real constitutional constraints; but virtually alone among campaign
finance measures this is an area where Congress and state and local governments have
considerable discretion to set policy and make law.
Thus, the real challenges for our legislatures will be to revise and update our
disclosure laws in light of the technological and legal developments that have changed
the settings in which disclosure applies.  This Article sets out some proposals for
revising the rules governing disclosure by individuals that should simultaneously
enhance the voter education function of disclosure while reducing the burden on
small donors, and for obtaining the disclosure of the identities of the large donors to
organizations that engage in independent campaign spending without impinging on
the privacy of donors whose political activity is not focused on elections.  But more
important than the specifics of these proposals is the need for our disclosure laws to
be revised to address the challenges that prompted them.  If they are not, then our
disclosure laws will be increasingly ineffective in actually serving the purposes that
justify their adoption.
